Unofficial payments for acute state hospital care in Kazakhstan. A model of physician behaviour with price discrimination and vertical service differentiation
AbstractWe consider a discriminatory pricing and service differentiation model where: a)state physicians exploit their monopoly position and adjust quality to the unofficial payment made, and b)patients, perceiving state provision as poor, pay unofficially to improve it. Applying OLS and probit analysis to survey data on patients discharged from Almaty City hospitals, and using admission wait, length of stay (LOS) and a subjective categorical variable as quality measures. Unofficial payments are positively associated with surgical admission wait and the subjective quality of care while negatively associated with hospital LOS. Evidence suggests that price discrimination and service differentiation takes place in Kazakhstan.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 224.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
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transition economies; unofficial or informal payments for health care; length of stay; ordered probit and marginal effects;
Other versions of this item:
- Robin Thompson & Ana Xavier, 2002. "Unofficial Payments for Acute State Hospital Care In Kazakhstan. A Model of Physician Behaviour with Price Discrimination and Vertical Service Differentiation," LICOS Discussion Papers 12402, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2003-06-16 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EDU-2003-06-16 (Education)
- NEP-HEA-2003-06-16 (Health Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2003-06-16 (Transition Economics)
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- World Bank, 2011. "Albania - Out-of-Pocket Payments in Albania’s Health System : Trends in Household Perceptions and Experiences 2002-2008," World Bank Other Operational Studies 2784, The World Bank.
- Robin Thompson & Ana Xavier, 2004.
"Are Patients in the Transition World Paying Unofficially to Stay Longer in Hospital? Some Evidence from Kazakhstan,"
LICOS Discussion Papers
14004, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- Robin Thompson & Ana Xavier, 2010. "Are Patients in the Transition World Paying Unofficially to Stay Longer in Hospital? Some Evidence from Kazakhstan," Working Papers id:2485, eSocialSciences.
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