Quality Choices in a Vertical Structure: National Brands vs Private Labels in Grocery Retailing
Abstract
The paper analyzes quality choices in a vertical structure involving a monopolist food manufacturer (national brand-NB producer) and a monopolist retailer supplying both the national brand as well as a private label (PL). The analysis is based on a threestage dynamic game. According to the results, in the Nash equilibrium the two players choose the maximum possible qualities for their products. This means that the B food manufacturer seeks the maximum product differentiation, while the LP retailer seeks the minimum product differentiation. The behavior of the two players appears to be consistent with actual developments in the food markets as well as with earlier empirical studies documenting the efforts of NB food manufacturers to increase product differentiation.Download Info
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Article provided by Greek Association of Agricultural Economists in its journal Agricultural Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages:
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Related research
Keywords: Quality Choice; ational Brand; Private Label; Agribusiness; D21; Q13;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Avenel, E. & Caprice, S., 2006.
"Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-334, March.
- Avenel, Eric & Caprice, Stéphane, 2006. "Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
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