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Citations for "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem"

by F. Gul

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  1. Francesca Flamini, . "Bargining and Investment," Working Papers 2005_6, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2009. "Information and the hold-up problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 405-423.
  3. Kawai, Keiichi, 2011. "Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller," MPRA Paper 29688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Campbell Leith & Leopold von Thadden, 2006. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Working Papers 2006_6, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  5. Spiros Bougheas & Tim Worrall, 2001. "Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/07, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001.
  6. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  7. Francesca Flamini, 2007. "Long-run Negotiations withDynamic Accumulation," Working Papers 2007_23, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  8. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA.
  9. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Selling Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1743R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2012.
  11. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  12. Sloof, Randolph, 2008. "Price-setting power vs. private information: An experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 469-486, April.
  13. Silvia Dominguez-Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," CESifo Working Paper Series 3172, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2015. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 318-46, August.
  15. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
  17. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  18. Patrick Gonz�lez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
  19. Ferdinand A. Von Siemens, 2009. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem¤," Post-Print hal-00674101, HAL.
  20. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
  21. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
  22. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 57, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  23. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2006. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 1786, CESifo Group Munich.
  24. von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2009. "Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 486-494, August.
  25. Randolph Sloof, 2003. "Price-setting Power versus Private Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-099/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  26. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  27. Marina Halac, 2015. "Investing in a relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 165-185, 03.
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