Cost padding in regulated monopolies
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- Spiros Bougheas & Tim Worrall, 2001. "Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/07, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2016. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," MPRA Paper 73487, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Garret Kent Fellows, "undated". "Capital Input Decisions under Rate of Return Regulation," Working Papers 2014-37, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 06 Nov 2014.
- Olga Chiappinelli, 2016. "Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1607, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
More about this item
KeywordsCost padding; Costly state falsification; Endogenous screening;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
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