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Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly

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  • V. Bhaskar
  • Nikita Roketskiy

Abstract

We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relative to the situation where consumption choices are observed by the later seller.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2019. "Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly," Papers 1904.07644, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1904.07644
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.07644
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    1. repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:8:p:2308-51 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
    3. Øyvind Thomassen & Howard Smith & Stephan Seiler & Pasquale Schiraldi, 2017. "Multi-category Competition and Market Power: A Model of Supermarket Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2308-2351, August.
    4. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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