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Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets

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Listed:
  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Ali Makhdoumi
  • Azarakhsh Malekian
  • Asu Ozdaglar

Abstract

When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sharing and may further reduce welfare. We propose a scheme based on mediated data sharing that improves efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asu Ozdaglar, 2022. "Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 218-256, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:218-56
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200200
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy

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