Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller
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- Kawai, Keiichi, 2011. "Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller," MPRA Paper 29688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gea M. Lee & Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare," Discussion Paper Series 1301, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, revised 2017.
- Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
- Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 19-45.
More about this item
KeywordsAdverse selection; Bargaining; Delay; Moral hazard;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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