Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets
This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. We then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness. The relationship between the first-best and second-best mechanisms is also explored. JEL Classification: C7 ; D4 ; D61 ; D82
|Date of creation:||2010|
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