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Definable and Contractible Contracts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
  3. Jimenez-Gomez, David, 2025. "Cooperative and competitive reasoning: From games to revolutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
  4. Paul Duetting & Michal Feldman & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2024. "Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey," Papers 2412.16384, arXiv.org.
  5. Karl Wärneryd, 2014. "Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5089, CESifo.
  6. Seungjin Han, 2020. "Quasi Ex-Post Equilibrium in Competing Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-11, McMaster University.
  7. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2025.
  8. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper 519, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Oct 2021.
  9. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
  10. Severinov, Sergei & Virag, Gabor, 2024. "Who wants to be an auctioneer?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
  11. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 11-36, March.
  12. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
  13. Raghul S. Venkatesh, 2025. "Commitment contracts with action constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(4), pages 675-715, December.
  14. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
  15. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
  16. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017. "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 297-315.
  17. Li, Anqi & Xing, Yiqing, 2020. "Intermediated implementation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
  18. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
  19. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés, 2024. "Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  20. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
  21. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
  22. Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022. "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  23. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
  24. Peck, James, 2018. "Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 126-161.
  25. Szentes, Balázs, 2015. "Contractible contracts in common agency problems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66071, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  26. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
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