Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

Citations

Cited by:

1. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
   • Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
2. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005.
   • Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
3. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
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   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, May.
   • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
5. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
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6. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1451, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • V.V. Bhaskar, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," 2007 Meeting Papers 136, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1571, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
7. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2007. "Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 382-413, July.
8. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics.
9. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
10. Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
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11. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
12. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
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13. Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2011. "Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 073, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
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14. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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18. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
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19. Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
20. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
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    • Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?," TSE Working Papers 17-792, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
21. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
22. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
23. Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring [Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 2201-2256.
24. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
25. Li, Rui, 2010. "Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 322-326, September.
26. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
27. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
    • David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
28. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
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29. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
30. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
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31. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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36. Kandori Michihiro, 2003. "Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 345-353, January.
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37. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
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    • V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    • Bhaskar, V & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 8873, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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43. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
44. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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46. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
47. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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54. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
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