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Citations for "Oligopoly Limit Pricing"

by Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey

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  1. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Entry-Deterring Nonlinear Pricing with Bounded Rationality," MPRA Paper 57935, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2014.
  2. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007. "Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
  3. Thomas Jensen, 2013. "Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality," Discussion Papers 13-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Byoung Heon Jun & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000041, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 9905, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jan 2000.
  6. Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y. & Yehezkel, Y., 2009. "Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab," Other publications TiSEM 2f596fe7-d2d9-4429-8bcf-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  7. Martinelli, Cesar & Matsui, Akihiko, 2002. " Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 39-61.
  8. Martin, Stephen, 1995. "Oligopoly limit pricing: Strategic substitutes, strategic complements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 41-65, March.
  9. Cesaltina Pires & Sílvia Jorge, 2012. "Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 671-698, August.
  10. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2009. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 7476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2013. "Can Poorly Informed Regulators Hinder Competition?," Working Papers 2013-3, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
  12. de Bijl, P.W.J., 1995. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in Markets for Search Goods," Discussion Paper 1995-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  13. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Advertising and Coordination," Discussion Papers 903, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183.
  15. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  16. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0613, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  17. Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2005. "Competition between insurers with superior information," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5356, Paris Dauphine University.
  18. Thomas Jensen, 2009. "Electoral Competition when Candidates are Better Informed than Voters," EPRU Working Paper Series 2009-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  19. Segendorff, Björn, 1995. "The Telecommunication Market: A Survey of Theory and Empirics," Working Paper Series 442, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  20. Honryo, Takakazu, 2013. "Signaling Competence in Elections," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 442, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.