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The Telecommunication Market: A Survey of Theory and Empirics

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  • Segendorff, Björn

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

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  • Segendorff, Björn, 1995. "The Telecommunication Market: A Survey of Theory and Empirics," Working Paper Series 442, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0442
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    File URL: https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp442.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunication; Survey; Monopoly; Deregulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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