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Citations for "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium"

by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
  3. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine.
  4. Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org.
  5. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  6. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  7. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  8. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  9. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  11. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  13. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  14. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  15. Perea, Andr├ęs, 2014. "Belief in the opponents╩╝ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  16. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  17. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  19. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
  21. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  22. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  23. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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