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Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 364-381.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020. "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 96-120.
  4. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  5. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  6. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004. "Learning to play Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
  7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2022. "Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-20, October.
  8. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
  9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  11. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2010. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 103-123, January.
  12. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  13. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  14. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  15. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  16. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
  17. Jagau, Stephan & Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in psychological games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  18. , & ,, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  19. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  20. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 20(1), pages 52-66, February.
  21. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-29.
  23. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  24. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  25. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  26. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  28. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
  29. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  30. Xiao Luo & Ben Wang, 2022. "An epistemic characterization of MACA," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 995-1024, June.
  31. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  32. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  33. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  34. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  35. Iryna Topolyan, 2020. "On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 183-201, March.
  36. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
  37. Rubén Becerril-Borja & Andrés Perea, 2020. "Common belief in future and restricted past rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 711-747, September.
  38. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 60, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  40. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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