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Citations for "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium"

by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew

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  1. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. S. Nageeb Ali, 2009. "Learning Self-Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000384, David K. Levine.
  6. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  9. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  10. Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
  11. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  12. Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3200611, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  14. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine.
  15. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  16. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  18. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  19. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
  20. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  21. Perea, Andr├ęs, 2014. "Belief in the opponents╩╝ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  22. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  23. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.