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Citations for "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts"

by Ma, C.A.

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  3. Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005. "Double moral hazard and renegotiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.
  4. F. Gul, 2000. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s10, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
  6. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai, 2000. "Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 449-462, July.
  7. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  9. Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995. "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 298., Boston College Department of Economics.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 487-511, 09.
  13. Steven Matthews, . "Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity," Penn CARESS Working Papers a1fc611f7c8c403f24c4d20a6, Penn Economics Department.
  14. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
  15. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‚ÄźNeutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, 05.
  16. Mohan Bijapur, 2011. "Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  17. Florin \c{S}abac, 2007. "Dynamic Agency with Renegotiation and Managerial Tenure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 849-864, May.
  18. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," Microeconomics 9705002, EconWPA.
  19. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2009. "Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1962-1980, December.
  20. R. Amit & Parthasarathy Ramachandran, 2010. "A Fair Contract for Managing Water Scarcity," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(6), pages 1195-1209, April.
  21. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  22. Abraham Wickelgren, . "The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1061, American Law & Economics Association.
  23. Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 347., Boston College Department of Economics.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  27. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
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