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Citations for "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts"

by Ma, C.A.

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  1. F. Gul, 2000. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s10, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
  3. Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005. "Double moral hazard and renegotiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.
  4. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
  5. Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 347., Boston College Department of Economics.
  6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  8. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  9. R. Amit & Parthasarathy Ramachandran, 2010. "A Fair Contract for Managing Water Scarcity," Water Resources Management, Springer, vol. 24(6), pages 1195-1209, April.
  10. Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai, 2000. "Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 449-462, July.
  13. Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 2003. "Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9629, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  15. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‚ÄźNeutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, 05.
  16. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 6086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Mohan Bijapur, 2011. "Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  21. Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995. "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 298., Boston College Department of Economics.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Abraham Wickelgren, . "The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1061, American Law & Economics Association.
  24. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2009. "Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1962-1980, December.
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