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Citations for "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium"

by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine

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  1. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  2. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  3. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Perea, Andr├ęs, 2014. "Belief in the opponents╩╝ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  5. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine.
  6. Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  7. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
  9. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine.
  10. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
  14. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  15. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  16. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  17. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  18. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  19. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  21. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  22. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
  23. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  24. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
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