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Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  2. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Vigier, Adrien & Bizzotto, Jacopo, 2019. "Information Design with Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 13868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
  4. Andrew Kosenko, 2020. "Mediated Persuasion," Papers 2012.00098, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  5. Pavel Ilinov & Andrei Matveenko & Maxim Senkov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Optimally Biased Expertise," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp736, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  6. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
  7. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
  8. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  9. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  10. Yin, Libo & Zhu, Xiaoye, 2025. "Investor–firm interactions versus investor–investor interactions: Which enhances investor learning better?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 104(PA).
  11. Shota Ichihashi & Alexey Smolin, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," Working Papers hal-04954135, HAL.
  12. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  13. Yi Liu & Yang Yu, 2024. "Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication," Papers 2411.19431, arXiv.org.
  14. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
  15. Navin Kartik & Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2021. "Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 165-182, June.
  16. Andrew Li & R. Ravi & Karan Singh & Zihong Yi & Weizhong Zhang, 2025. "How to Sell High-Dimensional Data Optimally," Papers 2510.15214, arXiv.org.
  17. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  18. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  19. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018. "On the value of persuasion by experts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 103-123.
  20. Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023. "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  21. Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2025. "Data provision to an informed seller," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 131-144.
  22. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  23. Makoto Shimoji, 2023. "Setting an exam as an information design problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 559-579, September.
  24. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
  26. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
  27. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
  28. Smirnov, Aleksei & Starkov, Egor, 2025. "Designing social learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
  29. Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2021. "An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2081-2116, September.
  30. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
  31. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
  32. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  33. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
  34. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
  35. J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2023. "Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  36. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  37. Shaofei Jiang, 2024. "Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender," Papers 2401.14087, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  38. Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Changing Simplistic Worldviews," Papers 2401.02867, arXiv.org.
  39. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
  40. Meng, Delong, 2021. "Learning from like-minded people," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 231-250.
  41. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
  42. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
  43. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  44. Negrelli, Sara, 2020. "Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 67-85.
  45. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  46. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  47. Axel Anderson & Nikoloz Pkhakadze, 2023. "Polarizing Persuasion," Working Papers gueconwpa~23-23-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  48. Dana Sisak & Philipp Denter, 2024. "Truth, Lies, and Social Ties: When Image Concerns Fuel Fake News," Papers 2410.19557, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
  49. David Autor & Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin & Philip Marx, 2025. "Misaligned by Design: Incentive Failures in Machine Learning," Papers 2511.07699, arXiv.org.
  50. Rastislav Rehak & Maxim Senkov, 2021. "Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp708, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  51. Gradwohl, Ronen & Heller, Yuval & Hillman, Arye, 2025. "How social media can undermine democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  52. Anderson, Axel & Pkhakadze, Nikoloz, 2025. "Polarizing persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 181-198.
  53. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
  54. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  55. Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio & Melguizo-López, Isabel, 2024. "Evidence disclosure with heterogeneous priors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 69-74.
  56. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
  57. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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