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The life insurance market: Asymmetric information revisited

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Cited by:

  1. Bedsworth, Fredrick & Neal, Daniel R. & Portillo, Javier E. & Willardsen, Kevin, 2021. "Asymmetric information and insurance: An experimental approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
  2. Deryugina, Tatyana, 2012. "Does Selection in Insurance Markets Always Favor Buyers?," MPRA Paper 53583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Amelie C. Wuppermann, 2017. "Private Information in Life Insurance, Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 855-881, October.
  4. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022. "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting And Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 981-1020, August.
  5. Gan, Li & Huang, Feng & Mayer, Adalbert, 2015. "A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 197-200.
  6. Courtney Harold Van Houtven & Norma B. Coe & R. Tamara Konetzka, 2015. "Family Structure and Long‐Term Care Insurance Purchase," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(S1), pages 58-73, March.
  7. He, Daifeng, 2011. "Is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 113-115, July.
  8. Nathaniel Hendren, 2015. "Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 21819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz, 2018. "Racial disparities in life insurance coverage," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 94-107, January.
  10. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz & Charles Courtemanche, 2021. "Did COVID‐19 change life insurance offerings?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(4), pages 831-861, December.
  11. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," IDEI Working Papers 839, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2016.
  12. Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
  13. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz, 2017. "Nudging Life Insurance Holdings In The Workplace," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 951-981, April.
  14. Hanming Fang & Edward Kung, 2021. "Why do life insurance policyholders lapse? The roles of income, health, and bequest motive shocks," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(4), pages 937-970, December.
  15. Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
  16. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Yuan‐ji Huang & Muhammad Farhan Bashir, 2020. "Research of two‐period insurance contract model with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 293-307, April.
  17. Teh, Tse-Ling, 2017. "Insurance design in the presence of safety nets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 47-58.
  18. Nathaniel Hendren, 2013. "Private Information and Insurance Rejections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1713-1762, September.
  19. Petra Persson, 2020. "Social Insurance and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 252-300.
  20. Harris, Timothy & Yelowitz, Aaron, 2014. "Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 520-522.
  21. Feng Gao & Michael R. Powers & Jun Wang, 2017. "Decomposing Asymmetric Information in China's Automobile Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1269-1293, December.
  22. Hanming Fang & Zenan Wu, 2018. "Multidimensional private information, market structure, and insurance markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 751-787, September.
  23. R. Tamara Konetzka & Ye Luo, 2011. "Explaining lapse in long‐term care insurance markets," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(10), pages 1169-1183, October.
  24. Yue Li, 2018. "Economic Analysis Of Social Security Survivors Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 2043-2073, November.
  25. Thomas Mariotti, 2016. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," 2016 Meeting Papers 820, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. Xi Wu & Li Gan, 2013. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information in Life Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 19629, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Daniel Bauer & Jochen Russ & Nan Zhu, 2020. "Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1143-1175, July.
  28. Spindler, Martin, 2015. "Asymmetric information in (private) accident insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 85-88.
  29. Tomas J. Philipson & George Zanjani, 2013. "Economic Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty induced by Health Shocks: A Review and Extension," NBER Working Papers 19005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Sutcliffe, Charles, 2015. "Trading death: The implications of annuity replication for the annuity puzzle, arbitrage, speculation and portfolios," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 163-174.
  31. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz & Jeffery Talbert & Alison Davis, 2023. "Adverse selection in the group life insurance market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(4), pages 911-941, October.
  32. Xi Wu & Li Gan, 2023. "Multiple dimensions of private information in life insurance markets," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 65(5), pages 2145-2180, November.
  33. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
  34. Zenker, Juliane & Herrmann, Tabea, 2016. "Risk-type and preference-based selection and stability of funeral insurance associations in Thailand," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145653, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  35. Wuppermann, Amelie Catherine, 2011. "Empirical Essays in Health and Education Economics," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13187, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  36. , & ,, 2012. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  37. Nathaniel Hendren, 2017. "Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1778-1823, July.
  38. Harris, Timothy F. & Yelowitz, Aaron & Talbert, Jeffery & Davis, Alison, 2022. "Adverse Selection in the Group Life Insurance Market," IZA Discussion Papers 14985, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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