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Is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market?

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  • He, Daifeng

Abstract

This paper finds evidence of dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market. Lower-risk individuals are more likely to cancel a policy, and to cancel one of greater face value conditional on cancelation, than are individuals with higher mortality risk.

Suggested Citation

  • He, Daifeng, 2011. "Is there dynamic adverse selection in the life insurance market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 113-115, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:113-115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 224-228, May.
    2. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2003. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 299-328.
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    4. He, Daifeng, 2009. "The life insurance market: Asymmetric information revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1090-1097, October.
    5. Bernard Salanié, 2003. "Testing Contract Theory," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 49(3), pages 461-477.
    6. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
    7. Cochrane, John H, 1995. "Time-Consistent Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 445-473, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz, 2018. "Racial disparities in life insurance coverage," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 94-107, January.
    2. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz & Charles Courtemanche, 2021. "Did COVID‐19 change life insurance offerings?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(4), pages 831-861, December.
    3. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz, 2017. "Nudging Life Insurance Holdings In The Workplace," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 951-981, April.
    4. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz & Jeffery Talbert & Alison Davis, 2023. "Adverse selection in the group life insurance market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(4), pages 911-941, October.
    5. Ropponen, Olli & Kuusi, Tero & Valkonen, Tarmo, 2022. "Mind the Gap – Assessing the Size and Determinants of the Life Insurance Gap," ETLA Working Papers 96, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    6. Harris, Timothy & Yelowitz, Aaron, 2014. "Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 520-522.
    7. Harris, Timothy F. & Yelowitz, Aaron & Talbert, Jeffery & Davis, Alison, 2022. "Adverse Selection in the Group Life Insurance Market," IZA Discussion Papers 14985, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Srbinoski Bojan & Strozzi Fernanda & Poposki Klime & Born Patricia H., 2020. "Trends in Life Insurance Demand and Lapse Literature," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-46, July.

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