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Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Akosah, Nana Kwame & Alagidede, Imhotep Paul & Schaling, Eric, 2020. "Testing for asymmetry in monetary policy rule for small-open developing economies: Multiscale Bayesian quantile evidence from Ghana," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 22(C).
  2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7716 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Saito, Yuta, 2025. "Exit expectations and the optimal design of a currency union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
  4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7684 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Mark Gradstein, 2018. "Self-imposition of public oversight," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 95-109, April.
  6. Giri Parameswaran & Hunter Rendleman, 2022. "Redistribution under general decision rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 159-196, February.
  7. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  8. Paul Schure & Amy Verdun, 2008. "Legislative Bargaining in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 459-486, December.
  9. Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2016. "Too Little, Too Late? Monetary Policymaking Inertia and Psychology: A Behavioral Model," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1617, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  10. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
  11. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1032, August.
  12. Mark Gradstein, 2017. "Self-Imposition Of Public Oversight," Working Papers 1711, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  13. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
  14. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  15. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2008. "The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions," Working Papers 338, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  16. Clara Ponsati & Jan Zapal, 2026. "Electing the pope: Elections by repeated ballots," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp815, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  17. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2018. "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 107-120.
  18. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2009. "On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 281-296, April.
  19. Yuta Saito, 2022. "A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-8, February.
  20. Bruno Beltrão Léo & Maria Teresa Vieira Campos Proença & Carlos Francisco Ferreira Alves, 2025. "Central bank committee decision-making: a systematic literature review and research agenda," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(3), pages 320-339, September.
  21. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2017. "Mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 133-152.
  22. Saito, Yuta, 2020. "A note on exit and inflation bias in a currency union," MPRA Paper 102717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
  24. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 524-540.
  25. Gradstein, Mark & Kaganovich, Michael, 2019. "Legislative restraints in corporate bailout design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 337-350.
  26. Tiberiu Dragu & Mattias Polborn, 2009. "Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series 2864, CESifo.
  27. Paul Schure & Francesco Passerelli & David Scoones, 2007. "When the Powerful Drag Their Feet," Department Discussion Papers 0703, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
  28. Qingqing Cheng & Ming Li, 2019. "Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, June.
  29. Baerg, Nicole Rae & Krainin, Colin, 2022. "Divided committees and strategic vagueness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  30. DanielJ. Seidmann, 2008. "Optimal Quotas in Private Committees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 16-36, January.
  31. Graham, Brett & Bernhardt, Dan, 2015. "Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 59-88.
  32. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
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