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Optimal Quotas in Private Committees

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  • DanielJ. Seidmann

Abstract

According to conventional wisdom, raising the quota either causes a committee to retain the status quo or has no effect on its performance; so a committee which would otherwise select good decisions should operate with a low quota. We show that conventional wisdom may fail when members vote in private: raising the quota may prevent such a committee from retaining the status quo, and can cause it to switch between new decisions. Nevertheless, reducing the quota may improve a private committee's performance. Copyright 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • DanielJ. Seidmann, 2008. "Optimal Quotas in Private Committees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 16-36, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:525:p:16-36
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
    2. University of Montreal & Alessandro Riboni, 2009. "Ideology and Endogenous Constitutions," 2009 Meeting Papers 988, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.

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