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Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Monotonicity

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. David Martimort & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Lionel Thomas, 2025. "Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability," Working Papers hal-04991014, HAL.
  2. Felipe Balmaceda, 2020. "Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 601-637, June.
  3. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022. "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
  4. Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2013. "Loss Aversion, Stochastic Compensation, and Team Incentives," Discussion Paper Series 107, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jul 2013.
  5. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
  6. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  7. Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2016. "Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 958-989, December.
  8. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
  9. Jewitt, Ian & Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2008. "Moral hazard with bounded payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 59-82, November.
  10. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
  11. Bond, Philip & Gomes, Armando, 2009. "Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 175-211, January.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Engert Andreas & Goldlücke Susanne, 2017. "Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, March.
  14. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 168-206.
  15. Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Sonia Giannatale & Giselle Labrador-Badía, 2024. "Risk Aversion, Reservation Utility and Bargaining Power: An Evolutionary Algorithm Approximation of Incentive Contracts," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 63(2), pages 477-511, February.
  16. de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique & Lambertsen, Nikolaj Niebuhr, 2025. "Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
  17. Joshua Ronen & Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari, 2007. "Demand for the truth in principal–agent relationships," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 125-153, March.
  18. Mario Tirelli, 2017. "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0230, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  19. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Fair Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-30, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  20. Eric S. Chou & Chien-Lung Chen, 2015. "Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1069-1090, October.
  21. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
  22. Jessica Martin, 2020. "The Risk-Sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model," Working Papers hal-02566942, HAL.
  23. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/175947, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  24. Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2013. "Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 468-489.
  25. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  26. Jessica Martin, 2021. "The Risk-Sharing Problem Under Limited Liability Constraints in a Single-Period Model," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 854-872, June.
  27. Bijapur, Mohan, 2011. "Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  28. Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics.
  29. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.
  30. Miglo, Anton, 2014. "Choice of financing mode as a stochastic bounded control problem," MPRA Paper 56323, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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