IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v93y2000i2p260-276.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
  2. Guha, Brishti, 2019. "Malice and patience in Rubinstein bargaining," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 264-270.
  3. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
  4. Hamid Aghadadashli & Christian Wey, 2015. "Multiunion Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 666-695, December.
  5. Yulan Wang & Baozhuang Niu & Pengfei Guo & Jing-Sheng Song, 2021. "Direct Sourcing or Agent Sourcing? Contract Negotiation in Procurement Outsourcing," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(2), pages 294-310, March.
  6. Galasso, Alberto, 2007. "Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6718, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
  8. Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2021. "Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  9. Alberto Galasso, 2007. "Broad Cross-License Agreements andPersuasive Patent Litigation: Theory andEvidence from the Semiconductor Industry," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 45, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  10. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 364-379.
  11. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
  12. Maurya, Amit Kumar, 2018. "Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments," MPRA Paper 89583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Elliott, Matt & Nava, Francesco, 2019. "Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  15. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  16. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
  17. Maurya, Amit Kumar, 2015. "Multilateral Bargaining with Discrete Surplus," MPRA Paper 67558, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Francesca Flamini, 2020. "Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 121-153, November.
  19. Zaber, Moinul & Sirbu, Marvin, 2012. "Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of 3G technology," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 762-782.
  20. Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Grazyna Wiejak-Roy, 2021. "Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(3), pages 261-298.
  21. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2009. "Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout," MPRA Paper 18951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
  23. Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Prasad Bhattarcharya, 2016. "Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Holdout," Discussion Papers 16-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  24. Soumendu Sarkar & Dhritiman Gupta, 2023. "Bargaining for assembly," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 229-254, August.
  25. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
  26. Amoros, Pablo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2006. "Bargaining and waning commitments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 417-422, September.
  27. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  28. Jijian Fan, 2023. "Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-8, September.
  29. Gantner, Anita & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fairness and efficiency in a subjective claims problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 21-36.
  30. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly," Working papers 320, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  31. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2023. "Collective hold-up," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  32. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Optimal mechanism for land acquisition," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 87-116, March.
  33. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Working Paper Series 2006:29, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  34. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
  35. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Inefficiencies in a Model of Team Formation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 195-215, May.
  36. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
  37. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
  38. Miettinen, Topi & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining," Working Papers 0679, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  39. Amit Kumar Maurya & Shubhro Sarkar, 2013. "Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with asymmetric sellers," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  40. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Bargaining Order in a Multi-Person Bargaining Game," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1150, The University of Melbourne.
  41. Wei Zhang & Jingqi Wang & Reza Ahmadi & Sriram Dasu, 2021. "Timing the Price Agreement in High‐Tech Component Procurement," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(11), pages 4105-4120, November.
  42. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2009. "Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 318-338, March.
  43. Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023. "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 548-580.
  44. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
  45. Suchan Chae & Seho Kim, 2019. "The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 143-155, March.
  46. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
  47. Clark Derek J & Pereau Jean-Christophe, 2008. "Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, December.
  48. Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.
  49. Park, Minsoo & Lee, Sang-Woo & Choi, Yong-Jae, 2011. "Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 118-126, March.
  50. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Soumendu Sarkar, 2017. "Mechanism design for land acquisition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 783-812, August.
  52. Sarkar, Shubhro, 2016. "Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-20.
  53. Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael, 2015. "Breakdown in multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 478-484.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.