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Citations for "Communication, consensus, and knowledge"

by Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul

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  1. Azomahou T.T. & Opolot D., 2014. "Beliefs dynamics in communication networks," MERIT Working Papers 034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
  2. Houy, Nicolas & Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 140-152, November.
  3. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00194381 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-330, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, communication and knowledge : an extension with bayesian agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00194381, HAL.
  6. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2011. "On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 733-739.
  7. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
  8. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Shyam Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
  10. Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 454, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
  12. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
  13. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  14. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  15. Bach, Christian W. & Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 48-59.
  16. Frederic Koessler, 2000. "Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0887, Econometric Society.
  17. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  18. Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
  19. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2014. "Does one Bayesian make a difference?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 423-452.
  20. Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
  21. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  22. Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2006. "Communication Protocols with Belief Messages," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 63-74, 08.
  23. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2013. "A general framework for rational learning in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
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