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Citations for "Communication, consensus, and knowledge"

by Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul

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  1. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011. "Communication, timing, and common learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
  2. Frédéric Koessler, 2000. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Working Papers of BETA 2000-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  3. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
  4. Shyam Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
  5. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  6. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2014. "Does one Bayesian make a difference?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 423-452.
  7. Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 909-968.
  8. Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
  9. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
  11. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2011. "On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 733-739.
  12. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  13. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
  14. Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, Communication and Knowledge : an Extension with Bayesian Agents," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
  15. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2013. "A general framework for rational learning in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  16. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 184, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  17. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00194381 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  19. Bach, Christian W. & Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 48-59.
  20. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
  21. Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2006. "Communication Protocols with Belief Messages," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 63-74, 08.
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