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Citations for "Communication, consensus, and knowledge"

by Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul

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  1. Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, Communication and Knowledge : an Extension with Bayesian Agents," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
  2. Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
  3. Frederic Koessler, 2000. "Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0887, Econometric Society.
  4. Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
  5. Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 454, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011. "Communication, timing, and common learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
  7. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  8. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2013. "A general framework for rational learning in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  9. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
  10. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2014. "Does one Bayesian make a difference?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 423-452.
  11. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2011. "On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 733-739.
  12. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
  13. Shyam NMI Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm213, Yale School of Management.
  14. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00194381 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Bach, Christian W. & Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 48-59.
  17. Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2006. "Communication Protocols with Belief Messages," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 63-74, 08.
  18. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 184, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  19. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  20. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  21. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
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