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Limited records and reputation bubbles

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016. "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 728-774.
  2. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Correlation as an Incentive Device," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
  3. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2018. "Optimal Exclusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1814, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  4. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
  5. Jianyu Yu & Dongling Cai & Qiang Gong & Jiaying Mo, 2024. "Food safety, voluntary recall and firm reputation," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 397-418, August.
  6. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
  7. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2024. "Memory and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(3), pages 1775-1806.
  8. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
  9. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
  10. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
  11. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
  12. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
  13. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  14. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
  15. Li, Feng & Du, Timon C. & Wei, Ying, 2021. "With whom should I work? Ratings consideration for partner selection in a P2P supply chain network," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
  16. Navin Kartik & Elliot Lipnowski & Harry Pei, 2025. "Replacement and Reputation," Papers 2512.13351, arXiv.org.
  17. Daniel N Hauser, 2024. "Promoting a reputation for quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(1), pages 112-139, March.
  18. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
  19. Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 3-21, March.
  20. Hu, Ju, 2020. "On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 42-47.
  21. Knutsen, Magnus Våge, 2025. "Verification and reputational concerns: An experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
  22. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
  23. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
  24. Jungju Yu, 2021. "A Model of Brand Architecture Choice: A House of Brands vs. A Branded House," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(1), pages 147-167, January.
  25. David K. Levine, 2021. "The Reputation Trap," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2659-2678, November.
  26. Andrew Mell, 2015. "Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal," Economics Series Working Papers 770, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  27. Monte, Daniel & Pinheiro, Roberto, 2025. "Costly information intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
  28. Daniel Luo & Alexander Wolitzky, 2025. "Marginal Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(6), pages 2007-2042, November.
  29. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
  30. Navin Kartik & Elliot Lipnowski & Harry Pei, 2025. "Replacement and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2483, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  31. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  32. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  33. Georgy Lukyanov & Konstantin Shamruk & Ekaterina Logina, 2025. "Endogenous Quality in Social Learning," Papers 2508.20539, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
  34. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Reputation building through costly adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 586-626.
  35. Cai, Hongbin & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Liu, Chong & Zhou, Li-an, 2014. "Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 51-65.
  36. Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Logina, Ekaterina, 2025. "Endogenous Quality in Social Learning," TSE Working Papers 25-1680, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  37. Benjamin Sperisen, 2015. "Bad Reputation under Bounded and Fading Memory," Working Papers 1527, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  38. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  39. Zvika Neeman & Aniko Öry & Jungju Yu, 2019. "The benefit of collective reputation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 787-821, December.
  40. Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan, 2021. "Reputation and Sovereign Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1979-2010, July.
  41. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
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