IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v148y2013i3p953-973.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  2. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
  3. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
  4. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-15.
  5. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
  6. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2014. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3288-3296, October.
  7. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  8. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2014. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-36, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  9. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
  10. Seungjin Han & Andrew Leal, 2024. "Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment," Papers 2403.03317, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  11. Cristian Troncoso-Valverde, 2013. "Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods," Working Papers 46, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  12. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
  13. Seungjin Han, 2020. "Quasi Ex-Post Equilibrium in Competing Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-11, McMaster University.
  14. Koessler, Frédéric & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2013. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 117-126.
  15. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper 519, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Oct 2021.
  16. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
  17. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
  18. Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
  19. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
  20. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
  21. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-190, May.
  22. Seungjin Han, 2019. "General Competing Mechanisms with Frictions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-09, McMaster University.
  23. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  24. repec:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2015-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.
  26. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
  27. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
  28. Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2020. "Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  29. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
  30. Peck, James, 2018. "Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 126-161.
  31. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.