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Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

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Abstract

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.

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  • James Albrecht & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2013. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," Working Papers gueconwpa~13-13-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~13-13-05
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    1. Albrecht, James W & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1986. "The Efficiency of Search under Competition and Monopsony," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1246-1257, December.
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    8. Ronald Wolthoff & Lodewijk Visschers & Benjamin Lester, 2012. "Asking Prices and Inspection Goods," 2012 Meeting Papers 792, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
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    11. Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
    12. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
    13. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-15.
    2. James Albrecht & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2016. "Directed Search in the Housing Market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 19, pages 218-231, January.
    3. Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & Ritter, Moritz, 2018. "Bidding for teams," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 68-73.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    5. Mangin, Sephorah, 2017. "A theory of production, matching, and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 376-409.
    6. Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2016. "Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons," Working Papers 568, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Donna, Javier & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory, 2015. "Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion," MPRA Paper 66999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Lu Han & Chandler Lutz & Benjamin Sand & Derek Stacey, 2018. "Do Financial Constraints Cool a Housing Boom?," Working Papers 073, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    9. Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2017. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Preprints 171995, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    10. Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & Ritter, Moritz, 2014. "Efficient club formation in a frictional environment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 372-375.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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