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Directed Search in the Housing Market

  • Susan Vroman

    (Georgetown University)

  • Pieter Gautier

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • James Albrecht

    (Georgetown University)

In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The pricing mechanism we analyze reflects the way houses are bought and sold in the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are sometimes sold above, sometimes below and sometimes at the asking price. We consider two versions of our model. In the first version, all sellers have the same reservation value. In the second version, there are two seller types, and type is private information. For both versions, we characterize the equilibrium of the game played by buyers and sellers, and we prove efficiency. Our model offers a new way to look at the housing market from a search-theoretic perspective. In addition, we contribute to the directed search literature by considering a model in which the asking price (i) entails only limited commitment and (ii) has the potential to signal seller type.

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2013 Meeting Papers with number 1370.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:1370
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Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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  1. Derek G. Stacey, 2012. "Information, Commitment, and Separation in Illiquid Housing Markets," Working Papers 1289, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  28. James Albrecht & Axel Anderson & Eric Smith & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 641-664, 05.
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