IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v146y2011i2p401-424.html

Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  3. Gerard Domènech-Gironell & Caio Lorecchio & Oriol Tejada, 2024. "Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2024/479, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
  4. Joel Sobel, 2025. "On the function of language," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, June.
  5. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  6. Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000502, David K. Levine.
  8. Giovannoni, Francesco & Xiong, Siyang, 2019. "Communication under language barriers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 274-303.
  9. Jehiel, Philippe, 2021. "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
  10. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints," AMSE Working Papers 1856, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
  11. Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
  12. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
  13. Newton Jonathan, 2014. "Cheap Talk and Editorial Control," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
  14. Herrera, Helios & Glazer, Jacob & Perry, Motty, 2018. "Fake Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 13244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Sadowski, Philipp, 2016. "Overeagerness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 114-125.
  16. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
  17. Meijian Yang & Enjun Xia & Yang Yang, 2023. "Deterring Sellers’ Cheap Talk Actions via Online Rating Schemes," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-16, March.
  18. Deivis Angeli & Matt Lowe & The Village Team & Matthew Lowe, 2023. "Virtue Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series 10475, CESifo.
  19. Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
  20. Federico Vaccari, 2023. "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
  21. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
  22. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
  23. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
  24. Dilmé, Francesc, 2022. "Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 1-19.
  25. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
  26. Vaccari, Federico, "undated". "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  27. Starkov, Egor, 2023. "Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  28. Sobel, Joel, 2025. "On the function of language," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3tb9m070, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  29. Ricardo Alonso & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2025. "Competitive Capture of Public Opinion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(4), pages 1265-1297, July.
  30. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
  31. Sobel, Joel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0015j574, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  32. Nika Haghtalab & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Markus Mobius & Divyarthi Mohan, 2022. "Communicating with Anecdotes," Papers 2205.13461, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  33. Suzuki, Toru, 2017. "Directives, expressives, and motivation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  34. Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen, 2024. "Manipulation and obfuscation of financial reports," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1-2), pages 276-296, January.
  35. Iván Marinovic, 2015. "The Credibility of Performance Feedback in Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 165-188, March.
  36. Dahjin Kim & Gechun Lin & Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2024. "Informative campaigns, overpromising, and policy bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(4), pages 344-366, October.
  37. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  38. Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023. "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 254-280.
  39. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  40. Lafky, Jonathan & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 92-116.
  41. Daniel H. Wood, 2022. "Communication-Enhancing Vagueness," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-27, June.
  42. Siguang Li & Xi Weng, 2017. "Random Authority," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 211-235, February.
  43. Xiong Xiong & Zhang Jin & Jin Xi & Feng Xu, 2016. "Review on Financial Innovations in Big Data Era," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(6), pages 489-504, December.
  44. Kai Barron & Tilman Fries, 2023. "Narrative Persuasion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 469, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  45. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  46. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  47. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2022. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2283-2318, September.
  48. Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022. "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 325-340.
  49. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers vie2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  50. Moon, Ji-Woong, 2023. "Strategic referrals and on-the-job search equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 135-151.
  51. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
  52. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
  53. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  54. Toru Suzuki, 2025. "Communication frictions and equilibrium pragmatics," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-25, June.
  55. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers 2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  56. Benjamin Young, 2022. "Misperception and Cognition in Markets," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-15, October.
  57. Daniel F. Stone, 2016. "A few bad apples: Communication in the presence of strategic ideologues," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(2), pages 487-500, October.
  58. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, "undated". "Welfare in Experimental News Markets," FEEM Working Papers 329585, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  59. Bernabe, Angelique & Hossain, Tanjim & Yu, Haomiao, 2021. "Truth, Honesty, and Strategic Interactions," MPRA Paper 109968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.