Cheap talk and editorial control
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 522-544, September.
- Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
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- repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:345-363 is not listed on IDEAS
- Basov Suren & Danilkina Svetlana, 2015. "Bertrand Oligopoly with Boundedly Rational Consumers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, January.
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KeywordsWikipedia; editorial control; Cheap talk;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-02-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-03 (Microeconomics)
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