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Evolutionary stability and social norms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andreas Nicklisch & Irenaeus Wolff, 2011. "Cooperation Norms in Multiple‐Stage Punishment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 791-827, October.
  2. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2001. "Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 01-09-048, Santa Fe Institute.
  3. Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve?: The case of tipping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-64, May.
  4. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2011. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Working Papers evolutionarily_stable, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  5. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Peter Hans Matthews, 2000. "Technical Change and the Evolution of Class Conscious Norms," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 470-481, September.
  7. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
  8. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong’ong’a, 2004. "Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 407-429, October.
  9. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  10. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2016. "Bargaining with incomplete information: Evolutionary stability in finite populations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 118-131.
  11. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 395-408, September.
  12. Mauricio G. Villena & Marcelo J. Villena, 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 585-610, September.
  13. Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.
  14. Florian Herold, 2012. "Carrot or Stick? The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences in a Haystack Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 914-940, April.
  15. Azar, Ofer H., 2008. "Evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences: A general model and an application to the academic review process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 420-435, March.
  16. Poulsen, A., 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Papers 01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
  17. Oludamola Durodola & Deepika Chotee, 2019. "Cannabis Stock behavior and Investor’s Expectations on the TSX: A Mixed Method Approach," International Journal of Applied Economics, Finance and Accounting, Online Academic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 56-62.
  18. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
  19. Alex Lamarche-Perrin & André Orléan & Pablo Jensen, 2018. "Coexistence of several currencies in presence of increasing returns to adoption," Post-Print hal-01531277, HAL.
  20. Alex Lamarche-Perrin & André Orléan & Pablo Jensen, 2018. "Coexistence of several currencies in presence of increasing returns to adoption," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01531277, HAL.
  21. Lamarche-Perrin, Alex & Orléan, André & Jensen, Pablo, 2018. "Coexistence of several currencies in presence of increasing returns to adoption," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 496(C), pages 612-619.
  22. Massimiliano Landi & Pier Luigi Sacco, 2001. "Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 233-266, October.
  23. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach," Economics Working Papers 245, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  24. Lanse Minkler & Thomas Miceli, 2004. "Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(1), pages 27-50.
  25. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.
  26. Abbie Turiansky, "undated". "Collective Action in Games as in Life: Experimental Evidence from Canal Cleaning in Haiti," Mathematica Policy Research Reports b4f3a3ef599b43c6a875d9380, Mathematica Policy Research.
  27. Lamarche-Perrin, Alex & Orléan, André & Jensen, Pablo, 2018. "Coexistence of several currencies in presence of increasing returns to adoption," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 496(C), pages 612-619.
  28. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
  29. Agnès Festré, 2010. "Incentives And Social Norms: A Motivation‐Based Economic Analysis Of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 511-538, July.
  30. Müller, Stephan & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2014. "Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: Signaling internalized norms," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 221, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  31. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach," MPRA Paper 16923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Pfeuffer, Wolfgang, 2006. "Religion as a Seed Crystal for Altruistic Cooperation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5788, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  33. Bornik, Zosia B. & Dowlatabadi, Hadi, 2008. "Genomics in Cyprus: Challenging the social norms," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 84-93.
  34. Duncan K. Foley, 2017. "Information theory and behavior," Working Papers 1731, New School for Social Research, Department of Economics.
  35. Somanathan, E., 1997. "Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 253-265, October.
  36. Thomas J. Miceli & Alanson P. Minkler, 1997. "Preferences, cooperation, and Institutions," Working papers 1997-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  37. Alex Lamarche-Perrin & Andr'e Orl'ean & Pablo Jensen, 2018. "Coexistence of several currencies in presence of increasing returns to adoption," Papers 1801.04218, arXiv.org.
  38. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2012. "Could free-riders promote cooperation in the commons?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 85-101, January.
  39. Chih, Yao-Yu, 2016. "Social network structure and government provision crowding-out on voluntary contributions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 83-90.
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