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Citations for "Moral hazard with several agents : The gains from cooperation"

by Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David

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  1. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007. "Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-Up and Firm Organization," Discussion Papers 2007/26, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  2. Meijerink, Gerdien W., 2007. "If services aren't delivered, people won't pay: the role of measurement problems and monitoring in Payments for Environmental Services," 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France 7948, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  3. Perez-Castrillo, J.D., 1992. "Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 180.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2008. "Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 410-440.
  5. Ola Kvaløy & Trond Olsen, 2014. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 4783, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Severinov,S., 1999. "On information sharing and incentives in R&D," Working papers 26, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2006. "The rise of individual performance pay," Discussion Papers 2006/22, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  8. AGRELL, Per & BOGETOFT, Peter, 2011. "Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization," CORE Discussion Papers 2011072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  10. Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2006. "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents," Economics Working Papers we20090204, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  11. Román, Francisco J., 2009. "An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity, product quality, and absenteeism," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 589-618, July.
  12. Ola Kval�y & Trond E. Olsen, 2006. "Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 139-170, January.
  13. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2008. "To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 393-411, March.
  14. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Isabel Maria Medalho Pereira, 2007. "Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 721.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  16. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 442-474, 09.
  17. Bernd Theilen, 2008. "Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2453, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
  20. Fabio Landini & Antonio Nicolò & Marco Piovesan, 2013. "The Hidden Cost of Specialization," IFRO Working Paper 2013/9, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
  21. Jeon, Seonghoon, 1996. "Moral hazard and reputational concerns in teams: Implications for organizational choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 297-315, May.
  22. Ekaterina Goldfayn, 2006. "Organization of R&D With Two Agents and Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
  23. Michel Trommetter & Alban Richard, 2000. "Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 145-155.
  24. Pastor, Maite & Sandonis, Joel, 2002. "Research joint ventures vs. cross licensing agreements: an agency approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 215-249, February.
  25. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
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