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Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 721.07.

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Length: 56
Date of creation: 07 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:721.07
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  1. Argyres, Nicholas S. & Liebeskind, Julia Porter, 1998. "Privatizing the intellectual commons: Universities and the commercialization of biotechnology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 427-454, May.
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  6. Lee, Yong S, 2000. " The Sustainability of University-Industry Research Collaboration: An Empirical Assessment," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 111-33, June.
  7. Balconi, Margherita & Laboranti, Andrea, 2006. "University-industry interactions in applied research: The case of microelectronics," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1616-1630, December.
  8. Audretsch, David B, et al, 2002. " The Economics of Science and Technology," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 155-203, April.
  9. Macho-Stadler, I. & Perez-Castrillo, J.D., 1991. "Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains From Cooperation," DELTA Working Papers 91-26, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  10. Rosenberg, Nathan, 1990. "Why do firms do basic research (with their own money)?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 165-174, April.
  11. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Cassiman, Bruno, 2005. "R&D cooperation between firms and universities. Some empirical evidence from Belgian manufacturing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(5-6), pages 355-379, June.
  12. Paula E. Stephan, 1996. "The Economics of Science," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1199-1235, September.
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