Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard
I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio
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