IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/gamebe/v11y1995i2p173-192.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1996. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games," Working Paper Series 450, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
  3. Sawa, Ryoji & Zusai, Dai, 2019. "Evolutionary dynamics in multitasking environments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 288-308.
  4. Reinhard Ullrich, 2017. "The Continuous Time Infection–Immunization Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 492-506, September.
  5. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
  6. Jonathan Newton, 2017. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 583-589, May.
  7. Rota Bulò, Samuel & Bomze, Immanuel M., 2011. "Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 193-211, January.
  8. Aradhana Narang & A. J. Shaiju, 2019. "Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1126-1142, December.
  9. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Net gains in evolutionary dynamics: A unifying and intuitive approach to dynamic stability," Papers 1805.04898, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  10. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
  11. Poulsen, A., 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Papers 01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
  12. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
  13. Christina Pawlowitsch, 2006. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language.An approach based on the replicator dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0604, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  14. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
  15. Newton, Jonathan, 2017. "Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 517-534.
  16. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2012. "Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 311-320.
  17. Dharini Hingu & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao & A. J. Shaiju, 2018. "Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 141-156, March.
  18. M. El-Hodiri & K. Schlag & B. Moldovanu & C. Lucifora & D. Croix & S. Gomulka, 1996. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 107-123, February.
  19. Xin Gao & Juqin Shen & Weijun He & Fuhua Sun & Zhaofang Zhang & Xin Zhang & Liang Yuan & Min An, 2019. "Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(7), pages 1-28, April.
  20. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion," Working Papers 2005:37, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  21. Ralf Peters, 2000. "Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 315-324, July.
  22. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Lia, 2005. "Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 285-301, April.
  23. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
  25. Heller, Yuval, 2014. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 132-136.
  26. Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
  27. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
  28. Anuraag Bukkuri & Joel S. Brown, 2021. "Evolutionary Game Theory: Darwinian Dynamics and the G Function Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-19, September.
  29. Christina Pawlowitsch, 2006. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language," Vienna Economics Papers vie0604, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  30. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  31. Miyashita Haruki, 2018. "On a trade-off in the evolution of ownership," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1257-1260.
  32. Li, Meng & Lu, Shibao & Li, Wei, 2022. "Stakeholders′ ecological-economic compensation of river basin: A multi-stage dynamic game analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  33. MILCHTAICH, Igal, 1999. "How does selfishness affect well-being ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.