Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics
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References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0191-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pietro Dindo & Jan Tuinstra, 2011.
"A Class of Evolutionary Models for Participation Games with Negative Feedback,"
Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 37(3), pages 267-300, March.
- Pietro Dindo & Jan Tuinstra, 2010. "A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback," LEM Papers Series 2010/14, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Dindo, P.D.E. & Tuinstra, J., 2010. "A class of evolutionary model for participation games with negative feedback," CeNDEF Working Papers 10-09, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Schimit, P.H.T. & Santos, B.O. & Soares, C.A., 2015. "Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 437(C), pages 204-217.
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KeywordsRevision protocol Evolutionary stability Equilibrium selection Fictitious play Replicator dynamics Best response Learning population games;
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