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Citations for "Signalling with Many Signals"

by Engers, Maxim

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  1. Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 152-173, May.
  2. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Luís Almeida Costa & Luís Vasconcelos, 2010. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 259-301, 06.
  4. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de, 2004. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 553, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  5. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges.
  6. Massimo Giannini, 1999. "Education and Job market signalling: How robust is the nexus?," Working Papers 35, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  7. Sanghoon Lee, 2007. "The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 785-807, 08.
  8. Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998. "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 518, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  9. Yawen Jiao, 2010. "Debt issues and capital structure with soft information," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 4-21, January.
  10. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2008. "Credible ratings," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
  11. Clements, Matthew T., 2011. "Low quality as a signal of high quality," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 5, pages 1-22.
  12. Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality Even Without Repeat Purchases," Working Papers 2008-18, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  13. Sandleris, Guido, 2008. "Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 267-275, December.
  14. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto & Tsuchida, Marcos, 2011. "Do dividend changes signal future earnings?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 117-134, January.
  15. Silvia Rossetto, 2013. "IPO activity and information in secondary market prices," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 667-687, November.
  16. Peterson, Steven P., 1996. "Some experimental evidence on the efficiency of dividend signaling in resolving information asymmetries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 373-388, May.
  17. Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  18. Chernew, Michael E. & Frick, Kevin D., 1999. "The impact of managed care on the existence of equilibrium in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 571-590, October.
  19. Silvia Rossetto, 2008. "The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 29-53, January.
  20. Chemmanur, Thomas & Yan, An, 2009. "Product market advertising and new equity issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 40-65, April.
  21. Massimo Giannini, 1997. "Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment," Game Theory and Information 9704002, EconWPA.
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