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Signalling with Many Signals

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Costa, Luis Almeida e & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2008. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp539, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  2. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, pages 1041-1063.
  3. Sanghoon Lee, 2007. "The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 785-807, August.
  4. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, "undated". "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges.
  5. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2008. "Credible ratings," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  6. Yawen Jiao, 2010. "Debt issues and capital structure with soft information," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 4-21, February.
  7. Smart, Michael, 2000. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-169, February.
  8. Sandleris, Guido, 2008. "Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 267-275.
  9. Luís Almeida Costa & Luís Vasconcelos, 2010. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 259-301, June.
  10. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998. "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information 9811002, EconWPA.
  11. Massimo Giannini, 1999. "Education and Job market signalling: How robust is the nexus?," Working Papers 35, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  12. Silvia Rossetto, 2008. "The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs," Annals of Finance, Springer, pages 29-53.
  13. Takaoka, Sumiko, 2005. "The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, pages 59-81.
  14. Peterson, Steven P., 1996. "Some experimental evidence on the efficiency of dividend signaling in resolving information asymmetries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 373-388.
  15. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Clements, Matthew T., 2011. "Low quality as a signal of high quality," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 5, pages 1-22.
  17. Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 152-173.
  18. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de, 2004. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 553, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  19. Chernew, Michael E. & Frick, Kevin D., 1999. "The impact of managed care on the existence of equilibrium in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, pages 571-590.
  20. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 243-267.
  21. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998. "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information 9811002, EconWPA.
  22. Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality Even Without Repeat Purchases," Working Papers 2008-18, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  23. Silvia Rossetto, 2013. "IPO activity and information in secondary market prices," Annals of Finance, Springer, pages 667-687.
  24. repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1012441210338 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Silvia Rossetto, 2013. "IPO activity and information in secondary market prices," Annals of Finance, Springer, pages 667-687.
  26. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto & Tsuchida, Marcos, 2011. "Do dividend changes signal future earnings?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, pages 117-134.
  27. Massimo Giannini, 1997. "Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment," Game Theory and Information 9704002, EconWPA.
  28. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-26.
  29. Chemmanur, Thomas & Yan, An, 2009. "Product market advertising and new equity issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 40-65.
  30. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2008. "Credible ratings," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
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