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A Multi-Attribute Negotiation Support System with Market Signaling for Electronic Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Tung Bui

    (University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Jerome Yen

    (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

  • Jiuru Hu

    (Digital Insight)

  • Siva Sankaran

    (California State University)

Abstract

Despite the rapid growth of technology and Internet-based markets, many of the current systems limit themselves to price as the single dimension variable and offer, if at all, only minimal negotiation support to the consumer. In the real world, commercial transactions take into account many other parameters both quantitative and qualitative such as product quality, speed, reputation, after sales service, etc. This paper discusses how these multiple attributes can be captured to augment standard negotiation processes in order to support electronic market transactions. Using a combination of utility theory and multicriteria decision-making, we propose heuristic algorithms to discover potential trades. In addition, the approach is included within a larger framework that incorporates market-signaling mechanisms. This not only allows for the systematic evolution of negotiation positions among buyers and sellers but can ultimately lead towards improving both market transparency and efficiency. To illustrate the multiple criteria model coupled with the dynamic market signaling framework, we report in this paper the implementation of a Web-based clearinghouse that serves the real estate market.

Suggested Citation

  • Tung Bui & Jerome Yen & Jiuru Hu & Siva Sankaran, 2001. "A Multi-Attribute Negotiation Support System with Market Signaling for Electronic Markets," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 515-537, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1012441210338
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1012441210338
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gregory E. Kersten, 2001. "Modeling Distributive and Integrative Negotiations. Review and Revised Characterization," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 493-514, November.
    2. Engers, Maxim, 1987. "Signalling with Many Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 663-674, May.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ron Chi-Wai Kwok & Duanning Zhou & Quan Zhang & Jian Ma, 2007. "A Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision Making Model for IS Student Group Project Assessment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 25-42, January.
    2. Gregory E. Kersten & Hsiangchu Lai, 2007. "Negotiation Support and E-negotiation Systems: An Overview," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 553-586, November.
    3. Hsiangchu Lai & Her-Sen Doong & Chi-Chung Kao & Gregory E. Kersten, 2006. "Negotiators' Communication, Perception of Their Counterparts, and Performance in Dyadic E-negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 429-447, September.
    4. Eduarda Asfora Frej & Danielle Costa Morais & Adiel Teixeira de Almeida, 2022. "Negotiation Support Through Interactive Dominance Relationship Specification," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 591-620, June.
    5. Andrej Škraba & Miroljub Kljajić & Mirjana Kljajić Borštnar, 2007. "The Role of Information Feedback in the Management Group Decision-Making Process Applying System Dynamics Models," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 77-95, January.
    6. Munaku D. Mwangi & Wycliffe N. Arani, 2021. "Influence of E-Procurement on the Performance of State Corporations in Kenya," International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration, Inovatus Services Ltd., vol. 7(6), pages 45-51, September.
    7. Martin Bichler & Gregory Kersten & Stefan Strecker, 2003. "Towards a Structured Design of Electronic Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 311-335, July.
    8. S Eom & E Kim, 2006. "A survey of decision support system applications (1995–2001)," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 57(11), pages 1264-1278, November.
    9. Ching-Fen Lee & Pao-Long Chang, 2008. "Evaluations of Tactics for Automated Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 515-539, November.

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