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Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
  2. Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2010. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 61-89.
  3. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Voting for compromises: alternative voting methods in polarized societies," ECON - Working Papers 394, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Alpern, Steve & Chen, Bo, 2017. "The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(3), pages 1072-1081.
  5. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110-1150.
  6. Goldberg, Mitchell & Schär, Fabian, 2023. "Metaverse governance: An empirical analysis of voting within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  7. Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 461-481.
  8. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2019. "New Hampshire Effect: behavior in sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 325-349, June.
  9. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 771-798, October.
  10. Cary Frydman & Ian Krajbich, 2022. "Using Response Times to Infer Others’ Private Information: An Application to Information Cascades," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2970-2986, April.
  11. Arnaud Dellis & Sean D’Evelyn & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 171-200, July.
  12. Esteban F. Klor & Eyal Winter, 2018. "On public opinion polls and voters' turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 239-256, April.
  13. Eddie Dekel Jr. & Michele Piccione Jr., 2014. "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 162-179, November.
  14. Morton, Rebecca B. & Muller, Daniel & Page, Lionel & Torgler, Benno, 2015. "Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 65-81.
  15. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
  16. Hummel, Patrick, 2012. "Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 341-348.
  17. Bannikova, Marina & Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel), 2015. "Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order," Working Papers 2072/260957, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  18. Dmitriy Vorobyev & Azamat Valei & Andrei Matveenko, 2023. "Approval vs. Participation Quorums," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_438, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  19. Zeynep B. Irfanoglu & Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," Working Papers 14-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  20. Matveenko, Andrei & Valei, Azamat & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2022. "Participation quorum when voting is costly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  21. Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini, 2020. "Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress," NBER Working Papers 27822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2022. "Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 317-344, March.
  23. Aimone, Jason A. & Butera, Luigi & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Altruistic punishment in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 149-160.
  24. Hummel, Patrick & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Optimal primaries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 64-75.
  25. Iaryczower, Matias, 2007. "Strategic voting in sequential committees," Working Papers 1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  26. Mats Ekman, 2022. "Advance voting and political competition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 53-66, March.
  27. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
  28. Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  29. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2011. "Seeking Harmony Amidst Diversity: Consensus Building with Network Externalities," ISER Discussion Paper 0826, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  30. Somdeep Chatterjee & Jai Kamal, 2021. "Voting for the underdog or jumping on the bandwagon? Evidence from India’s exit poll ban," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 431-453, September.
  31. Dino Gerardi & Margaret A. McConnell & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2016. "Get Out The (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design For Greater Participation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1963-1979, October.
  32. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Maria Vittoria Levati & Ivan Soraperra, 2016. "Electing a parliament: an experimental study," Working Papers 11/2016, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  33. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3mdje1f65o8qrqpapnmrhon2vm is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Patrick Hummel & Brian Knight, 2015. "Sequential Or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(3), pages 851-887, August.
  35. Anna Bassi, 2015. "Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 58-85, January.
  36. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt & Katri K. Sieberg & Beth A. Freeborn, 2022. "An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-28, March.
  37. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2014. "Conclave," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-275.
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