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Citations for "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem"

by Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher

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  1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
  2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
  3. Dai, Meixing & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2012. "Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2371-2381.
  4. Andrea Beccarini, 2012. "Economic Reforms and the Indirect Role of Monetary Policy," CQE Working Papers 2512, Center for Quantitative Economics (CQE), University of Muenster.
  5. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1179-1191, November.
  6. Barry Eichengreen & Jürgen Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 3-23, February.
  7. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2010. "Why EMU is not a failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-11, March.
  8. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
  9. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
  10. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
  11. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, 03.
  12. Enrico MARCHETTI & Giuseppe CICCARONE, "undated". "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," EcoMod2008 23800083, EcoMod.
  13. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
  14. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2002. "The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination," Chapters, in: EMU and Economic Policy in Europe, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  15. Cover, James P. & VanHoose, David D., 2000. "Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 325-341.
  16. Ammer, John & Freeman, Richard T., 1995. "Inflation targeting in the 1990s: The experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-192, May.
  17. Ugo Panizza, 1997. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-29, January.
  18. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000. "A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June.
  19. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Levine, Paul, 1998. "Can political monetary cycles be avoided?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 525-545, October.
  20. Gustavo Piga, 2005. "On The Sources Of The Inflation Bias And Output Variability," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 52(4), pages 607-622, 09.
  21. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
  22. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  23. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2006. "On the private provision of fiat currency," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1683-1698, October.
  24. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2002. "Should central banks really be flexible?," Working Paper Series 0188, European Central Bank.
  25. Paolo Savona, 2006. "Michele Fratianni’s Professional Career and Contributions to Economic Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 365-371, December.
  26. Laurent GAGNOL & Moise SIDIROPOULOS, 2001. "The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries," Working Papers of BETA 2001-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  27. Gruner, Hans Peter, 1997. "A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy When Central Bankers Have Private Objectives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 127-143, July.
  28. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
  29. Reiner Eichenberger & Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(III), pages 327-353, September.
  30. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1995. "A simple model of disinflation and the optimality of doing nothing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1385-1404, August.
  31. Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2013. "Fiscal restraints by advisors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-232, August.
  32. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
  33. Muscatelli, V Anton, 1998. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences, and Central Bank Independence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 412-430, July.
  34. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
  35. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April.
  36. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
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