Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument
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- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel L. Thornton, 1988. "The borrowed-reserves operating procedures: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 30-54.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Bennett & Spence Hilton, 1997. "Falling reserve balances and the federal funds rate," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(May).
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993.
"Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-93, April.
- Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. & Stuart E. Weiner, 1996. "Monetary policy without reserve requirements: analytical issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-24.
- James A. Clouse & Douglas W. Elmendorf, 1997. "Declining required reserves and the volatility of the federal funds rate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-30, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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