Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument
No abstract is available for this item.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,"
NBER Working Papers
0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993.
"Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-93, April.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983.
"Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Daniel L. Thornton, 1988. "The borrowed-reserves operating procedures: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 30-54.
- Paul Bennett & Spence Hilton, 1997. "Falling reserve balances and the federal funds rate," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(May).
- James A. Clouse & Douglas W. Elmendorf, 1997. "Declining required reserves and the volatility of the federal funds rate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-30, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. & Stuart E. Weiner, 1996. "Monetary policy without reserve requirements: analytical issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-24.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:52:y:2000:i:4:p:325-341. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.