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Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument

  • Cover, James P.
  • VanHoose, David D.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7T-411XCR8-2/2/68a97166fa5694cfd94297e19c1ff3e2
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economics and Business.

Volume (Year): 52 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 325-341

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:52:y:2000:i:4:p:325-341
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeconbus

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  1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Daniel L. Thornton, 1988. "The borrowed-reserves operating procedures: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 30-54.
  3. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-93, April.
  4. Paul Bennett & Spence Hilton, 1997. "Falling reserve balances and the federal funds rate," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(May).
  5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  6. Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. & Stuart E. Weiner, 1996. "Monetary policy without reserve requirements: analytical issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-24.
  7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  8. James A. Clouse & Douglas W. Elmendorf, 1997. "Declining required reserves and the volatility of the federal funds rate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-30, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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