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Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers wp2009_0911, CEMFI.
  2. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Kamishiro, Yusuke, 2011. "Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 513-520, March.
  4. Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna & Michael Ostrovsky, 2015. "Group stability in matching with interdependent values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, March.
  5. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-17.
  6. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Oscar Volij, 2000. "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 63-79.
  8. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 721-728, July.
  9. Pomatto, Luciano, 2022. "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  10. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Matching with Incomplete Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  11. Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 258010, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  12. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
  13. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May.
  14. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Oct 2012.
  15. Yusuke Kamishiro & Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2022. "Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability," Working Papers 2022-001, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  16. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  17. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
  18. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 552-567, August.
  19. Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March.
  20. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
  21. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  22. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo.
  23. Yusuke Kamishiro, 2015. "On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 25(1), pages 17-32.
  24. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
  25. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Asker, John & Lee, SangMok, 2021. "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 15703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
  27. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 662-690, September.
  28. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  29. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2017. "The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 205-229, June.
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