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Investment in concealable information by biased experts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
  2. Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2026. "A Demand-Side Driven Explanation of Niche Lobbying: A Theory and Some Application to Climate-Biodiversity Policy," Working Papers hal-05488373, HAL.
  3. Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2021. "Dynamic expert incentives in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 27-47.
  4. Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017. "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 54-71.
  5. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2018. "Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 1811, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
  6. Dilip Ravindran & Zhihan Cui, 2020. "Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games," Papers 2008.08517, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
  7. Navin Kartik & Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2026. "Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs," Papers 2601.10048, arXiv.org.
  8. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Working Papers of BETA 2021-40, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  9. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
  10. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  11. Jeremy Bertomeu & Igor Vaysman & Wenjie Xue, 2021. "Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 658-692, June.
  12. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  13. Tsz-Ning Wong & Lily Ling Yang & Andrey Zhukov, 2024. "Optimal Disclosure Mandate in Supply Chains," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2024/468, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
  14. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  15. Arrora. Falak, 2025. "Screening Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1586, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  16. Bernardita Vial & Pilar Alcalde, 2020. "Intermediary Commissions in a Regulated Market with Heterogeneous Customers," Documentos de Trabajo 532, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  17. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  18. Oghenovo A. Obrimah, 2026. "Modeling of ability, effort, and now, ‘effort capacity’: a candidate general equilibrium structure," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 1-35, March.
  19. Shuo Liu & Dimitri Migrow, 2019. "Designing organizations in volatile markets," ECON - Working Papers 319, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  20. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2018. "Balance of opinions in expert panels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 151-154.
  21. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
  22. Onuchic, Paula, 2025. "Advisors with hidden motives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 129091, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  23. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
  24. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2017. "Preselection and expert advice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 693-714, August.
  25. Liu, Shuo & Migrow, Dimitri, 2022. "When does centralization undermine adaptation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  26. Onuchic, Paula, 2025. "Advisors with hidden motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 431-450.
  27. Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2021. "Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 1-27.
  28. Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio & Melguizo-López, Isabel, 2024. "Evidence disclosure with heterogeneous priors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 69-74.
  29. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
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