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Citations for "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment"

by Frank Heinemann

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  1. Leila Ali, 2012. "Flexibility: Stability's Best Friend in Non-transparent Countries?," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 247-264, December.
  2. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk," Post-Print hal-00607867, HAL.
  3. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: Unique equilibrium and transparency," Munich Reprints in Economics 19430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2002. "Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24935, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. repec:pit:wpaper:376 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination Cycles," ESE Discussion Papers 162, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  7. Todd Keister, 2006. "Expectations and Contagion in Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," 2006 Meeting Papers 485, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
  9. Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2003. "The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  10. Allsopp, Louise, 2002. "Common knowledge and the value of defending a fixed exchange rate--an explanation of a currency crisis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-79, March.
  11. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine.
  12. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-374, September.
  13. Naqvi, Nadeem & Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2012. "The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: The case of tax evasion," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  14. Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 2000. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 100, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  15. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
  16. Christian Hellwig, 2000. "Public Information, Private Information and the Multiplicity of Equilibrium in Co-ordination of Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp361, Financial Markets Group.
  17. Erler, Alexander & Bauer, Christian & Herz, Bernhard, 2015. "To intervene, or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 432-456.
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