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Citations for "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment"

by Frank Heinemann

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  1. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "Experimental Evidence On The 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk," CEPN Working Papers halshs-00602107, HAL.
  2. Christian Hellwig, 2000. "Public Information, Private Information and the Multiplicity of Equilibrium in Co-ordination of Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp361, Financial Markets Group.
  3. Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2003. "The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  4. Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp416, Financial Markets Group.
  5. repec:pit:wpaper:376 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Leila Ali, 2012. "Flexibility: Stability's Best Friend in Non-transparent Countries?," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 247-264, December.
  7. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Todd Keister, 2009. "Expectations And Contagion In Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1012, 08.
  10. Jakub Steiner, 2005. "Coordination Cycles," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp274, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  11. Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 2000. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 100, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  12. Erler, Alexander & Bauer, Christian & Herz, Bernhard, 2015. "To intervene, or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 432-456.
  13. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-, September.
  14. Allsopp, Louise, 2002. "Common knowledge and the value of defending a fixed exchange rate--an explanation of a currency crisis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-79, March.
  15. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: Unique equilibrium and transparency," Munich Reprints in Economics 19430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  16. Naqvi, Nadeem & Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2012. "The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: The case of tax evasion," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  17. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
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