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Citations for "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment"

by Frank Heinemann

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  1. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2014. "Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 315-323.
  2. Gerald Pech & Bernhard Neumaerker, 2002. "The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0213, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
  5. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-374, September.
  6. Erler, Alexander & Bauer, Christian & Herz, Bernhard, 2015. "To intervene, or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 432-456.
  7. Allsopp, Louise, 2002. "Common knowledge and the value of defending a fixed exchange rate--an explanation of a currency crisis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-79, March.
  8. Todd Keister, 2009. "Expectations And Contagion In Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1012, 08.
  9. Christian Hellwig, 2000. "Public Information, Private Information and the Multiplicity of Equilibrium in Co-ordination of Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp361, Financial Markets Group.
  10. Leila Ali, 2012. "Flexibility: Stability's Best Friend in Non-transparent Countries?," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 247-264, December.
  11. Neeman Zvika & Orosel Gerhard Oskar, 2002. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
  12. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
  13. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 308-327, May.
  14. Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp416, Financial Markets Group.
  15. Naqvi, Nadeem & Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2012. "The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: The case of tax evasion," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  16. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
  17. repec:pit:wpaper:376 is not listed on IDEAS
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