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Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Ockenfels
  • Rosemarie Nagel
  • Frank Heinemann

Abstract

No Abstract Available.Frank Heinemann link: http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/heinemann/heinemann.html Rosemarie Nagel link: http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/whois?01280

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp416, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp416
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    File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/DP416.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bannier, Christina E., 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/29, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    2. Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," Game Theory and Information 0309006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Fellner, Gerlinde & Guth, Werner & Maciejovsky, Boris, 2004. "Illusion of expertise in portfolio decisions: an experimental approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 355-376, November.
    4. Sanjay Banerjee & Michael Maier, 2016. "Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 54(4), pages 941-986, September.
    5. Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2017. "Global Inspection Games (GIG) in the laboratory," MPRA Paper 80715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Camille Cornand, 2006. "Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 797-817, November.
    7. Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Imperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games (October 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 211, UCLA Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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