Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
No Abstract Available.Frank Heinemann link: http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/heinemann/heinemann.html Rosemarie Nagel link: http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/whois?01280
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- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, March.
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- Frank Heinemann, 2000. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 316-318, March.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998.
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- Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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