Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
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- Heinemann, Frank & Nagel, Rosemarie & Ockenfels, Peter, 2002. "Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24935, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," Game Theory and Information 0309006, EconWPA.
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- Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2017. "Global Inspection Games (GIG) in the laboratory," MPRA Paper 80715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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