IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/aea/aecrev/v108y2018i1p147-69.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  2. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
  3. Shida, Jakob, 2023. "Primary market demand for German government bonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
  4. Ergun, Lerby & Uthemann, Andreas, 2020. "Higher-order uncertainty in financial markets: evidence from a consensus pricing service," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118893, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021. "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
  6. Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2019. "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue," Working Papers 267027285, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  7. Jason Allen & Milena Wittwer, 2023. "Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints," Staff Working Papers 23-51, Bank of Canada.
  8. José Miguel Cardoso da Costa & Rui Albuquerque, 2023. "Price elasticity of demand and risk-bearing capacity in sovereign bond auctions," Working Papers w202302, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  9. Klingler, Sven & Sundaresan, Suresh, 2023. "Diminishing treasury convenience premiums: Effects of dealers’ excess demand and balance sheet constraints," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 55-69.
  10. Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022. "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 420-464, November.
  11. Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 241-259, April.
  12. Philip A Haile & Yuichi Kitamura, 2019. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 22(1), pages 1-19.
  13. Samuel Häfner, 2023. "Risk aversion in share auctions: Estimating import rents from TRQs in Switzerland," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), pages 419-470, May.
  14. Kastl, Jakub, 2020. "Auctions in financial markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  15. Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019. "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers 320, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  16. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2021. "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  17. Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2019. "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," NBER Working Papers 25855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Song, Zhaogang & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2018. "Quantitative easing auctions of Treasury bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 103-124.
  19. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  20. Yotam Harchol & Dirk Bergemann & Nick Feamster & Eric Friedman & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Aurojit Panda & Sylvia Ratnasamy & Michael Schapira & Scott Shenker, 2020. "A Public Option for the Core," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2245, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  21. Takahiro Hattori & Shogo Takahashi, 2021. "Discriminatory versus uniform auctions:Evidence from JGB market," Discussion papers ron344, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan.
  22. Lee A. Smales, 2021. "The effect of treasury auctions on 10‐year Treasury note futures," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 1517-1555, April.
  23. Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Jesper Rüdiger, 2017. "Liquidity Shocks, Market Maker Turnover, and Bidding Behavior in Treasury Auctions," Discussion Papers 17-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  24. Deininger, Klaus W. & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Neyter, Roman, 2023. "Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 432-450.
  25. Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020. "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Staff Working Papers 20-29, Bank of Canada.
  26. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Bourjade Sylvain, 2019. "Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-14, January.
  28. Smales, L.A., 2021. "Macroeconomic news and treasury futures return volatility: Do treasury auctions matter?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
  29. Liu, Jinzhao & Gao, Shenghao & Zhou, Jun, 2019. "Clustering and discounting in auction-style SEOs – Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
  30. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.