Rent-seeking contests with independent private values
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References listed on IDEAS
- David A. Malueg & Andrew J. Yates, 2004. "Sent Seeking With Private Values," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 161-178, April.
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- Andrea Gallice, 2013. "Rent-seeking contests with private values and common knowledge about the mean," Working papers 023, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
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"Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests,"
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- Andrea Gallice, 2014. "Rent-seeking contests with private valuations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 390, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:372-391 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe, 2014. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 8368, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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More about this item
KeywordsRent seeking; conflict; independent private valuations; first-order stochastic dominance; mean-preserving spread.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-06-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-06-26 (Game Theory)
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