Rent-seeking contests with private values and common knowledge about the mean
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
rent-seeking; contests; private information; imperfect information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-01-17 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-01-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-01-17 (Microeconomics)
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