Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations
In the course of history a large number of politicians has been assassinated. A rational choice analysis is used to distinguish the expected marginal benefits of killing, and the marginal cost of attacking a politician. The comparative analysis of various equilibria helps us to gain insights into specific historical events. The analysis suggests that ï¿½ in addition to well-known security measures ï¿½ an extension of democracy, a rule by a committee of several politicians, more decentralization via the division of power and federalism, and a strengthening of civil society significantly reduce politiciansï¿½ probability of being attacked and killed.
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