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Electoral strategies in mixed systems of representation

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  • Mudambi, Ram
  • Navarra, Pietro

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  • Mudambi, Ram & Navarra, Pietro, 2004. "Electoral strategies in mixed systems of representation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 227-253, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:1:p:227-253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    2. Mudambi,Ram & Navarra,Pietro & Sobbrio,Giuseppe (ed.), 2001. "Rules and Reason," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521650571.
    3. Mudambi, Ram & Navarra, Pietro & Sobbrio, Giuseppe, 1999. "Changing the rules: political competition under plurality and proportionality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 547-567, September.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    5. Mudambi,Ram & Navarra,Pietro & Sobbrio,Giuseppe (ed.), 2001. "Rules and Reason," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521659598.
    6. Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2001. "Rules, Choice and Strategy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2312.
    7. Meehl, Paul E., 1977. "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 11-30, March.
    8. Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
    9. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    10. Cubbin, John S & Leech, Dennis, 1983. "The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(37), pages 351-369, June.
    11. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    12. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    13. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
    14. Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
    15. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    16. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    17. Bruno Frey, 1971. "Why do high income people participate more in politics?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 101-105, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Mixed Member Proportional; equal influence and assembly size," Discussion Papers 2020/10, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    2. Bernecker, Andreas, 2014. "Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 55-70.
    3. Stensholt, Eivind, 2019. "MMP-elections and the assembly size," Discussion Papers 2019/15, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    4. Stensholt, Eivind, 2021. "The Structure of MMP-Elections," Discussion Papers 2021/9, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Mario Daniele Amore & Margherita Corina, 2021. "Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(9), pages 1775-1796, December.
    6. Stensholt, Eivind, 2021. "Faithful accounting in MMP-elections," Discussion Papers 2021/7, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    7. Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco & Leonida, Leone, 2014. "The law of survival of the political class: An analysis of the Italian parliament (1946–2013)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 102-121.
    8. Stensholt, Eivind, 2021. "Mixed Member Proportional with faithful accounting," Discussion Papers 2021/5, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.

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