When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
It is well-known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections with an arbitrary number of candidates. Finally, when two candidates face the potential entrant of a third, we show that PSNE no longer exist, however, they do exist when the number of existing candidates is at least three.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January.
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