Liliput oder Leviathan? Der Staat in der Globalisierten Wirtschaft
Globalization is often seen to result in a smaller (Liliput) or larger (Leviathan) state. But future public activity will be more flexible. Persons have multiple identities. They can be citizens of sub- and supra-national jurisdictions, semi- and non-governmental organizations and private units, even profit-oriented firms. Such attachment may be temporary, multiple or partial. To actively choose strengthens loyalty and identification, which raises the willingness to pay for publicly supplied services (in the sense of quasi-voluntary taxation). On the supply side, Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) will develop. Such flexibility of the future European integration will make it successful.
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