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Liliput oder Leviathan? Der Staat in der Globalisierten Wirtschaft

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

Globalization is often seen to result in a smaller (Liliput) or larger (Leviathan) state. But future public activity will be more flexible. Persons have multiple identities. They can be citizens of sub- and supra-national jurisdictions, semi- and non-governmental organizations and private units, even profit-oriented firms. Such attachment may be temporary, multiple or partial. To actively choose strengthens loyalty and identification, which raises the willingness to pay for publicly supplied services (in the sense of quasi-voluntary taxation). On the supply side, Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) will develop. Such flexibility of the future European integration will make it successful.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Liliput oder Leviathan? Der Staat in der Globalisierten Wirtschaft," IEW - Working Papers 085, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:085
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
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    3. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
    4. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Tax Competition and International Public Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 111-120, March.
    5. Berthold, Norbert & Neumann, Michael, 2001. "Sozialsysteme im Wettbewerb - das Ende der Umverteilung?," Discussion Paper Series 41, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    6. Baldwin, Richard E. & Krugman, Paul, 2004. "Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-23, February.
    7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-073e, Santa Fe Institute.
    8. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joachim Wilde, 2007. "Ein Konzept der Anreizethik zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Grundsicherung nach Hartz IV," Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik - Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 8(2), pages 145-158.
    2. Döring, Thomas, 2005. "Räumliche Externalitäten von Wissen und ihre Konsequenzen für die Ausgestaltung des Finanzausgleichs," Forschungs- und Sitzungsberichte der ARL: Aufsätze,in: Das föderative System in Deutschland: Bestandsaufnahme, Reformbedarf und Handlungsempfehlungen aus raumwissenschaftlicher Sicht, pages 93-120 Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung (ARL) - Leibniz-Forum für Raumwissenschaften.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Globalization; Government; Public Goods; Citizen;

    JEL classification:

    • F01 - International Economics - - General - - - Global Outlook
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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